University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 5 Online Edition

Article 9

5-1-2018

Underdeveloped and Over-Sentenced: Why Eighteen- to TwentyYear-Olds Should Be Exempt From Life Without Parole
Emily Powell
University of Richmond School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges
Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Recommended Citation
Emily Powell, Underdeveloped and Over-Sentenced: Why Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds Should Be Exempt
From Life Without Parole, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 83 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss5/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

UNDERDEVELOPED AND OVER-SENTENCED: WHY
EIGHTEEN- TO TWENTY-YEAR-OLDS SHOULD BE
EXEMPT FROM LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
Reynolds Wintersmith was just twenty years old when he
learned he may spend the rest of his life in prison.1 In 1994, he
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a nonviolent drug crime.2 It was his first conviction.3
When United States District Judge Philip Reinhard was sentencing Reynolds, he struggled with the mandatory minimum requirements:4
Under the federal law I have no discretion in my sentencing. Usually
a life sentence is imposed in state courts when somebody has been
killed or severely hurt, or you got a recidivist . . . . [T]his is your first
conviction, and here you face life imprisonment . . . . [I]t gives me
pause to think that that was the intent of Congress, to put somebody
away for the rest of their life.5

1. Reynolds Wintersmith, FAMM, http://famm.org/reynolds-wintersmith/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018) [hereinafter FAMM].
2. Id.
3. Id. Reynolds’s involvement with drugs was unsurprising, given his childhood. As a
child, Reynolds was surrounded by drugs. John Kuhn, From the War on Drugs, a Story of
Redemption, CHI. REP. (Aug. 19, 2014), http://chicagoreporter.com/war-drugs-story-redemp
tion/. When he was eleven years old, he watched his mother die of a heroin overdose. Id.
After her death, he lived with his drug-dealing grandmother and was constantly amid
gang violence. Id.; Annie Sweeney, Year After Obama-Ordered Prison Release, Ex-Drug
Dealer Finds Career, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://chicagotribune.com/news/ct-life-afterprison-met-20141229-story.html. After his grandmother was sent to prison, Reynolds began to sell drugs to provide for his younger siblings when he was seventeen years old.
Kuhn, supra; Sweeney, supra. It was not long before the adults in the gang brought him
further into the drug ring as a leader. Kuhn, supra; FAMM, supra note 1. He was arrested
when he was nineteen years old and convicted on four counts as part of a conspiracy to
possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING
DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES
67
(2013),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets /111813-lwop-complete-report.pdf; Kuhn, supra.
4. Kuhn, supra note 3. To calculate his sentence, Reynolds’s crimes were run through
a formula that considered several factors, which resulted in a sentence of life plus forty
years in federal prison. Id. Reynolds was effectively sentenced to life without parole because the federal government abolished parole in the 1980s. See infra note 107.
5. FAMM, supra note 1.
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This comment contends that Reynolds Wintersmith belonged to
a class of offenders who should be categorically exempt from sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole should
be considered cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to
this class of offenders’ culpability.
The United States Supreme Court has categorically exempted
classes of offenders from punishment before.6 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that sentencing juveniles to death violated
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.7
The Court also held in Graham v. Florida that juveniles were
categorically exempted from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses.8 In coming to these decisions, the Court has given the same two reasons for categorically banning particular sentences for classes of offenders: (1) a
national consensus has formed against the sentence for the class
of offenders, and (2) the sentence is disproportionate to the culpability of the class of offenders.9
This comment argues that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds should
be categorically spared from life without parole for these same
two reasons.10 First, sentencing data suggests only a small portion of those sentenced to life without parole were between eighteen and twenty years old at the time of their crimes.11 This low
rate illustrates that the country appears to oppose sentencing
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to prison for the rest of their lives
without any opportunities for release. Second, sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole is a disproportionate punishment because scientific research shows that this class
of individuals shares the same mitigating characteristics as juvenile offenders.12 These characteristics diminish culpability and
6. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005).
7. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
8. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75.
9. See id. at 60–61; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–68.
10. Though beyond the scope of this comment, this class of offenders should also be
categorically spared from the death penalty. See generally Andrew Michaels, A Decent
Proposal: Exempting Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds From the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 139 (2016).
11. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 3, at 26 tbl.7; E. ANN CARSON &
WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AGING OF THE STATE PRISON POPULATION,
1993–2013, at 21 tbl.15 (2016) (basing data on prisoners sentenced to more than one year
in state prison on new court commitments).
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Per-
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thus make life without parole a disproportionate sentence for these offenders.
Part I of this comment describes the legal foundation for establishing categorical sentencing exemptions for classes of offenders,
discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper,13 Graham,14
and Miller v. Alabama.15 Part II outlines the behavioral, psychological, and neurological research surrounding the culpability of
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, arguing that there is scientific confirmation that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds’ brains are similar to
those of juveniles. Part III applies the Court’s categorical exemption test and concludes that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds should
be exempt from life without parole.16 In the end, eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds have more to offer the world in the long lives
they have ahead of them.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION
JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court created a test to categorically exempt offenders from sentences,17 and has applied this test to the death
penalty with regard to mentally disabled offenders and defendants under eighteen years of age at the time of their crimes.18 The
spective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 343 (1992) [hereinafter Arnett, Reckless Behavior]
(reckless behavior); Graham Bradley & Karen Wildman, Psychosocial Predictors of Emerging Adults’ Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 253, 253–54, 263
(2002) (peer pressure).
13. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
14. Graham, 560 U.S. 48.
15. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
16. While exempting twenty-four- and twenty-five-year-olds from life without parole
would be ideal, this paper posits that our country is much more likely to accept the categorical exemption of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds than of eighteen- to twenty-five-yearolds. Twenty-one years of age is already a culturally significant marker of maturity. See
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
922(b)(1), (c)(1) (2012)) (prohibiting anyone under twenty-one years of age from purchasing
handguns from Federal Firearms Licensees); National Minimum Drinking Age Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 437 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)) (prohibiting anyone under twenty-one years of age from purchasing alcohol); Fostering Connections to
Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, § 201, 122 Stat. 3949
(2008) (providing states with financial incentives to extend the age of eligibility for foster
care services to twenty-one years of age). Twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, and
twenty-five are not culturally significant ages. Until twenty-five years of age reaches the
same cultural significance as twenty-one, society will likely be less willing to support the
categorical exemption of twenty-one to twenty-five-year-olds.
17. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13 (2002) (describing the categorical tests).
18. Id. at 321 (mentally disabled offenders); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (juvenile offend-
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Court has also applied the test to life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders.19 While the Court held it is unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to mandatory life without parole in
homicide cases, it bypassed the categorical exemption test because it was not necessary to decide the case in question.20 This
part discusses the Court’s categorical exemption test and the relevant cases in which it has been implemented.
A. Atkins and Roper: The Supreme Court’s Two-Part Categorical
Exemption Test
In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that the
execution of defendants with mental disabilities violated the
Eighth Amendment.21 To support its holding, it engaged in a twopart analysis.22 First, the Court recognized that numerous states
were no longer executing those with mental disabilities, and
“even in those [s]tates that allow the execution of mentally [disabled] offenders, the practice is uncommon.”23 The Court found
that because the practice had become so unusual, “a national consensus [had] developed against it.”24
Second, the Court engaged in an independent proportionality
inquiry and held that executing those with mental disabilities
“will [not] measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
purpose of the death penalty.”25 The Court recognized that those
with mental disabilities “do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”26 People with mental disabilities are less likely to be deterred by capital punishment because of “their disabilities in
areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses.”27
ers).
19. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75.
20. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
21. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. The Court emphasized it had repeatedly held that “it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.” Id. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). The
Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–13.
23. Id. at 314–16.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. at 321. The second prong of this test invokes what is known as the proportionality principle. See id. at 311 (“We have repeatedly applied this proportionality precept in
later cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment.”).
26. Id. at 306.
27. Id. at 306, 319–20.
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Therefore, the Court found capital punishment was “excessive”
after “[c]onstruing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the
light of our ‘evolving standards of decency.’”28
Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the
execution of defendants younger than eighteen years of age at the
time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment.29 In reaching its decision, the Court engaged in its two-part analysis from
Atkins.30 It held that a national consensus had formed in opposition to executing juveniles, which was evidence that society views
juveniles as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”31
The Court then engaged in its independent proportionality inquiry and held the death penalty was an excessive punishment
for juveniles under the Eighth Amendment.32 The Court reasoned
that “[c]apital punishment must be limited to those offenders who
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”33 It reasoned that juveniles cannot be classified among the
worst of offenders because they differ from adults in three meaningful ways: (1) they lack maturity and a developed sense of responsibility; (2) they are “susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure;” and (3) their character is not as well-formed.34 The Court concluded these characteristics diminished culpability, and the two clear social purposes
served by the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—were
therefore not as adequate of justifications with regard to juveniles

28. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Roper extended the protection to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as the Court had already provided for those under sixteen
years of age. Id. at 570–71; see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
31. Id. at 567–68. The Court even recognized that “the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” Id.
at 575.
32. Id. at 568–75.
33. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
34. Id. at 569–70. The Court cited Arnett, Reckless Behavior, supra note 12, for the
first finding; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1014 (2003), for the second finding; and ERIK H. ERIKSON,
IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 26–28 (1968), for the third finding. The Court noted these
differences reflected both what “any parent knows” and what scientific and sociological
studies tend to confirm. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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as they are with adults.35
While the Court acknowledged that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual
turns 18,” it decided that a bright line needed to be drawn.36 After
recognizing that logic previously used to exclude offenders under
age sixteen from the death penalty37 could be extended to those
under eighteen, the Court concluded that because eighteen years
of age was “where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood,” this is also where “the line for
death eligibility ought to rest.”38 As the risk of executing juvenile
offenders with diminished culpability could not be remedied by an
individualized sentencing regime, offenders under eighteen years
old are categorically exempt from the death penalty.39
B. Graham: Analyzing Actual Sentencing Practices to Find a
National Consensus Against a Punishment
While Atkins and Roper provided the two-part categorical exemption test,40 Graham clarified the first prong of the test in
2010.41 In Graham, the Court applied the two-part test and held
that juveniles were categorically exempted from life without parole for non-homicide offenses.42 It found that a national consensus existed against this punishment even though the majority of
states permitted it.43 After considering the practices of states
where the sentence was permitted, the Court found the punishment was rarely utilized.44 For this reason, “an examination of actual sentencing practices . . . discloses a consensus against its
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
36. Id. at 574.
37. Thompson v. Oklahoma held that offenders under sixteen years of age could not be
sentenced to the death penalty. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
39. Id. at 572–73. There is an American Psychiatric Association rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing juveniles with antisocial personality disorder, otherwise known
as psychopathy or sociopathy. Id. at 573 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 701–06 (4th ed. text rev. 2000)). The Court
argued that “[i]f trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having
antisocial personality disorder, . . . [s]tates should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far
graver condemnation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.” Id.
40. Id. at 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13 (2002).
41. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61–62 (2010).
42. Id. at 74–75.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id.
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use.”45 The Court went on to note that only one state imposed the
“significant majority” of the sentences, and only ten states imposed the remainder.46 Graham therefore clarified that a national
consensus against a practice can be established by the mere infrequency of the particular sentence.47
When applying the second prong of the categorical exemption
test, the Court held that life without parole is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment when imposed on juvenile offenders for nonhomicide offenses for three reasons: (1) the offender’s lessened
culpability;48 (2) the severity of life without parole;49 and (3) the
lack of any legitimate penological justification—such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—to justify the
sentence.50
For the first concern, the Court reiterated the same three mitigating characteristics outlined in Roper.51 It also emphasized that
“[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by
its nature disproportionate to the offense.”52 The Court continued
to recognize that “because juveniles have lessened culpability
they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”53 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that “developments in psychology
and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,”54 including that “parts of the
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through
late adolescence.”55
When discussing its second concern—the severity of life with45. Id.
46. Id. at 64. Florida imposed the significant majority of sentences, and California,
Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Virginia imposed the remainder. Id. at 63–65 (citations omitted).
47. See id. at 62.
48. Id. at 68–69.
49. Id. at 69–71.
50. Id. at 71–74.
51. Id. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)). The Court cited
juveniles’ (1) “lack of maturity and . . . underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; (2) vulnerability “to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and (3)
character being “not as well formed” as adults’ character. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
569–70).
52. Id. at 71.
53. Id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Brief for the American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 16–24, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief
for the AMA]; Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 22–27, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)).
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out parole—the Court noted the sentence shares characteristics
with the death penalty that other sentences do not.56 For instance, the Court recognized the only hope offenders have in the
restoration of their most basic liberties is the remote chance of
executive clemency, “which does not mitigate the harshness of the
sentence.”57 Furthermore, the Court emphasized the importance
of time when it reasoned that after imposition of this sentence, “a
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”58 Therefore, imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders was especially severe.59
Finally, the Court examined four penological justifications for
sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses and found that none of them adequately justified the sentence.60 The Court ruled out (1) retribution because of juvenile offenders’ lessened culpability,61 (2) deterrence because of juveniles’
impulsiveness,62 (3) incapacitation because of their capacity for
change,63 and (4) rehabilitation because the sentence itself is contradictory to the rehabilitative ideal.64 Due to the lack of legitimate justification for sentencing juveniles to life without parole
for non-homicide offenses, the Court held the sentence was disproportionate and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.65
C. Miller: Bypassing the Categorical Exemption Test
The Supreme Court continued to rely on juvenile development
as a justification for exempting categories of juvenile offenders
when it decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012.66 The Court held it is
unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to mandatory life without
parole for homicide cases because mandatory sentencing schemes
do not allow judges or juries to consider the characteristics of
56. Id. at 69.
57. Id. at 69–70.
58. Id. at 70. The Court reasoned that “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.” Id. (citation
omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 71–74.
61. Id. at 71–72.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 72–73.
64. Id. at 73–74.
65. Id. at 74.
66. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–73, 477, 479 (2012).
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youth as mitigating factors.67 According to the Court, this mandatory sentencing scheme posed “too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment” because it made “youth (and all that accompanies it)
irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence.”68
The Court did not rely on the two-part categorical exemption
test in its holding.69 Rather, it combined its reasoning in Roper
and Graham regarding juvenile culpability with precedent requiring individualized sentencing when imposing capital punishment.70 The Court noted that life without parole should be treated
similarly to capital punishment when the offenders are juveniles
because it is such a severe sentence.71 Therefore, because youth is
significant in sentencing, the Court held that “a judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”72
II. SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS SURROUNDING THE CULPABILITY OF
YOUNG ADULTS
This Part outlines the behavioral, psychological, and neurological research surrounding the culpability of eighteen- to twentyyear-olds. As it will show, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds’ brains
are similar to those of juveniles. Therefore, they should be viewed
similarly to adolescents in terms of culpability due to the seriousness of life without parole.73

67. Id. at 474. The Court reasoned that precedent had established that “children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 471.
68. Id. at 479.
69. See id. at 480, 482–83. Although the Court discussed “objective indicia” in regards
to the first prong of the categorical exemption test, id. at 482–83, the crux of the holding
relied on a line of precedent mandating individualized sentencing, id. at 483, 485 n.11.
70. See id. at 470–71.
71. See id. at 474.
72. Id. at 489. The Court pointed out that the “distinctive (and transitory) mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities” of juveniles are not crime-specific. Id. at 473.
However, the Court still limited its holding to juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. Id.
at 479–80. One of the petitioners’ arguments was that the Eighth Amendment requires a
categorical ban on life without parole for all juveniles, regardless of the crime, at least for
those under fourteen years old. Id. at 479. The Court declined to consider the argument
because it reasoned it could sufficiently decide Miller by holding that life without parole
cannot be mandatory for juvenile homicide offenders. Id. at 479–80.
73. This comment posits that our country is much more likely to accept the categorical exemption of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds than of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds.
See supra note 16.
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A. Behavioral and Psychological Research
Behavioral and psychological research reveal eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds are more similar to adolescents than older
adults.74 For example, research shows impulsiveness increases
until early adulthood and subsequently declines.75 Eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds score lower than older adults on a test measuring the anticipation of consequences,76 and those under twentyone years of age are more likely to engage in risky behavior and
less likely to be sensitive to negative consequences than those between twenty-two and thirty years of age.77 One study showed
college-aged adults had a lesser ability to evaluate a situation before acting when compared to older adults, but there was no statistically significant difference in this ability when college-aged
adults were compared to adolescents.78 In regards to delinquency,
there was no statistically significant difference in rates of offenses between college-aged adults and adolescents, but there was a
difference between college-aged adults and older adults.79 Furthermore, eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds were more similar to
ten- to seventeen-year-olds in a study measuring psychosocial
maturity than they were to those who were at least twenty-six

74. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development
from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000); Bradley
& Wildman, supra note 12, at 253–54, 263; Kathryn L. Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the
Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 78, 85 tbl.3 (2007) (reporting a distinct difference between college-aged and older
adult participants on measures of temperance).
75. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 34, at 1013 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 260 (1996)) (“[I]mpulsivity increases between
middle adolescence and early adulthood and declines thereafter . . . .”).
76. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 35 tbl.1 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Age Differences].
77. See Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193,
203–04 (2010).
78. Modecki, supra note 74, at 85 (“[O]n measures of temperance, adults were significantly more mature than young-adults, college students, and adolescents.”). While this
study recognizes that young adults, who are between the ages of twenty-two and twentyseven, scored similarly to college-aged adults, this simply reinforces the claim that full
maturity, both psychological and neurological, is not attained until the mid- to latetwenties. Id. at 89 (“[E]motional temperance may continue to improve through the mid to
late twenties.”).
79. See id. at 86 (“[A]dults showed less delinquency than the adolescent, college student, and young-adult samples, whereas young-adults showed less delinquency than adolescents or college students.”). Modecki examined three different areas of delinquency in
her research: “stealing offenses, property offenses, and assault offenses.” Id. at 84.
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years old.80
Research suggests eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are also highly
susceptible to peer pressure.81 One study of 380 eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds, with a mean age of twenty,82 found that
“antisocial peer pressure was a highly significant (p < 0.001) predictor of reckless substance use and total recklessness . . . [and] . .
. a more marginally significant (p < 0.05) predictor of reckless
driving and sexual behaviors.”83 This indicates that “the reputedly ‘adolescent’ characteristic of peer pressure towards antisocial
behavior continues to have an important influence into emerging
adulthood” and thus “[p]eer pressure would . . . appear to be a
suitable target for intervention for all youth, at least until the
early-twenties age group.”84
B. Neurological Research
Neurological research also highlights how eighteen- to twentyyear-olds differ from older adults. Research has shown that human brains are not fully mature until at least the age of twentyfive.85 It has been recognized that “college-aged individuals may
have yet to fully develop neurologically . . . and thus may not be
equipped for mature judgment,”86 and that “[h]igher-order executive function, emotional regulation, and impulse control also improve through the mid-twenties.”87

80. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 591 fig.3 (2009).
81. See, e.g., Bradley & Wildman, supra note 12, at 263.
82. Id. at 257.
83. Id. at 263.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Rethinking the Childhood-Adult Divide: Meeting the
Mental Health Needs of Emerging Adults, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 20 (2015) (“One way
to best serve emerging adults is to recognize that their brain development continues until
the age of twenty-five.”); Nico U.F. Dosenbach et al., Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity Using fMRI, 329 SCI. 1358, 1359 fig.1 (2010) (reporting that functional brain maturity levels out around twenty-five years of age); Robin Marantz Henig, What Is It About
20-Somethings?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
18,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine /22Adulthood-t.html (“This new understanding comes largely from a longitudinal study of brain development sponsored by the
National Institute of Mental Health, which started following nearly 5,000 children at ages
3 to 16 . . . . The scientists found the children’s brains were not fully mature until at least
25.”).
86. Modecki, supra note 74, at 79.
87. Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055,
1115 (2010).
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The prefrontal cortex, which is the area of the brain “associated
with voluntary behavior control and inhibition such as risk assessment, evaluation of reward and punishment, and impulse
control,” is “one of the last brain regions to mature.”88 Eighteento twenty-year-olds’ prefrontal cortexes are undeveloped in two
ways.89 First, the gray matter of the brain has not fully matured
until after age twenty.90 Through a process called pruning, gray
matter decreases as the brain matures.91 Pruning is a process
that enhances overall brain function because it “leads to greater
efficiency of neural processing and strengthens the brain’s ability
to reason and consistently exercise good judgment.”92 The prefrontal cortex is “one of the last regions where pruning is complete and this region continues to thin past adolescence.”93 Therefore, “one of the last areas of the brain to reach full maturity . . .
is the region most closely associated with . . . the ability to reliably and voluntarily control behavior.”94
Second, the white matter of the brain does not fully mature until after age twenty.95 White matter facilitates communication between different parts of the brain in a fast and reliable manner.96
According to the American Medical Association, “resistance to
peer influence . . . may be linked to the development of greater
connectivity between brain regions,” and “the development of improved self-regulatory abilities during and after adolescence is
positively correlated with white matter maturation through the
process of myelination.”97

88. Brief for the AMA, supra note 55, at 16–18 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 18.
90. See id. at 20. Gray matter is comprised of “neurons that perform the brain’s tasks,
such as the higher functions that are carried out in the prefrontal cortex.” Id. at 19.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id.
95. Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of Human
Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10937,
10939 fig.2 (2011) (reporting a statistically significant increase in white brain matter volume for subjects between twenty and twenty-five years old); Adolf Pfefferbaum et al., A
Quantitative Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of Changes in Brain Morphology from
Infancy to Late Adulthood, 51 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 874, 885 (1994) (reporting that after
age twenty, white matter volume did not change until about approximately age seventy).
96. Brief for the AMA, supra note 55, at 21–22, 22 n.67.
97. Id. at 24. Myelin, a fatty white substance, insulates the pathways in which neural
signals travel. Id. at 21–22. Myelination is the process by which these pathways are coated
with myelin, and this process “continues through adolescence and into adulthood.” Id. at
22.
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The underdevelopment of gray and white matter also impacts
the brain’s reward system, which makes eighteen- to twenty-yearolds more susceptible to outside pressures than older adults.98 According to one neuroscientist, “[t]he brain’s reward system becomes highly active right around the time of puberty and then
gradually goes back to an adult level, which it reaches around age
25.”99 Due to these changes, “young adults become much more
sensitive to peer pressure than they were earlier or will be as
adults. . . . [A] 20 year old is 50 percent more likely to do something risky if two friends are watching than if he’s alone.”100 This
neurological research, in addition to the behavioral and psychological research discussed above, supports the conclusion that
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds lack the culpability for their crimes
necessary to sentence them to life without parole.
III. APPLICATION OF THE COURT’S TWO-PART CATEGORICAL
EXEMPTION TEST
This Part argues that the categorical exemption test should be
extended to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds for life without parole.101 If there is a national consensus against this sentencing
practice, and if such a sentence is disproportionate to the culpability of this class of offenders, then the Court should hold that
the Eighth Amendment categorically bans the sentencing of
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole.102 Applying
the Court’s categorical exemption test leads to the conclusion that
98. See Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:00
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. While the Supreme Court has held that juveniles are categorically exempt from
life without parole, mandatory or discretionary, for non-homicide offenses, Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010), it has declined to rule on whether juveniles should be
categorically exempt from life without parole for all crimes, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 479–80 (2012). Others have argued the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted to
categorically exempt all juveniles from life without parole, whether mandatory or discretionary. See generally Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of
Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489 (2013) (criticizing Miller for failing to hold that
the Eighth Amendment categorically bans the imposition of life without parole on juveniles, regardless of the crime). While it is beyond the scope of this comment, it is the author’s position that the Eighth Amendment should in fact be interpreted to require a categorical ban on life without parole for juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime or whether
the sentence is mandatory. This Part therefore assumes the categorical exemption test is
extended to all juveniles with regard to life without parole and to eighteen- to twentyyear-olds with regard to the death penalty. See generally Michaels, supra note 10.
102. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567–75 (2005).
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eighteen- to twenty-year-olds should be excluded from life without parole sentences.
A. Part One: There is a National Consensus Against Sentencing
Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds to Life Without Parole
The first part of the Court’s categorical exemption analysis requires determining whether a national consensus against the
sentencing practice exists.103 In doing so, the Court first considers
“objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.”104 However, the Court has
recognized “actual sentencing practices” are also integral when
inquiring into national consensus.105 A review of sentencing practices suggest there is a national consensus opposed to sentencing
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole.
Few statistics exist on the subject,106 but it is clear the imposition of life imprisonment in the federal criminal justice system107
is rare, regardless of age.108 In 2013, only 153 offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment in the federal system.109 There are at
least 45 federal statutes requiring life imprisonment as a minimum sentence, and 69 of those 153 offenders were subject to this
mandatory minimum.110 Of the remaining 84 cases, 79.8% were
subjected to guidelines where a life sentence was the only term of
imprisonment provided.111 The United States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”) specifically provides for life imprisonment in only four of the over 150 guidelines in the Commission’s Guidelines Manual.112 Even though life imprisonment is
103. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
104. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563.
105. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
106. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, further scholarly study should address
why there is a lack of information regarding sentencing practices unless they involve juveniles or the death penalty, and how this lack of transparency could potentially decrease
the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system.
107. Federal life imprisonment is effectively “life without parole” because federal parole
was abolished in the 1980s. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, at 2
(2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf.
108. GLENN R. SCHMITT & HYUN J. KONFRST, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, LIFE
SENTENCES
IN
THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM,
at
1
(2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-projectsand-surveys/miscellaneous/20150226_Life_Se ntences.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 3. These guidelines are for offenses involving “murder, treason, certain drug

2018]

UNDERDEVELOPED AND OVER-SENTENCED

97

possible at the high end of sentencing ranges for other offenses,
life sentences “generally occur only in cases where multiple sentencing enhancements in the guidelines had applied and where
the offender had a significant prior criminal record.”113 As of January 2015, there were 4436 federal prisoners serving life sentences, which is only 2.5% of the offenders in the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ system.114
Statistics specifically involving eighteen- to twenty-year-olds
suggest that sentencing this class of offenders to life without parole is uncommon. The ages of the 153 federal offenders sentenced to life imprisonment in 2013 ranged between twenty- and
eighty-years-old, with an average age of thirty-seven.115 This
means that of the few people sentenced to life in prison in federal
court, no eighteen- or nineteen-year-olds were sentenced to federal life imprisonment in 2013.116
Even studies broadly examining the ages of offenders suggest
that young adults are rarely sentenced to life without parole. A
Bureau of Justice Statistics study concluded that in 2013, only
one percent of eighteen- to thirty-nine-year-olds were sentenced
to life, life without parole, life plus additional years, or death.117
While this study examined an extremely large age bracket that
included four different types of sentences, this data supports the
notion that there is a national consensus against sentencing
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole. If only one
percent of offenders in an age bracket spanning twenty-one years
was sentenced to the harshest punishments in the criminal justice system, then it is likely that only a tiny portion of this already small statistic was between eighteen and twenty years old
when they were sentenced to life without parole in 2013.118
Reading these Bureau of Justice statistics alongside a smaller,
sentence-specific study further supports the idea that there is a
national consensus against this sentencing practice. Out of 355

trafficking offenses, and certain firearms offenses committed by career offenders.” Id.
113. Id. at 3–4.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 7.
116. See id.
117. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 11, at 21 tbl.15.
118. The author recognizes that this conclusion is based on inferences. However, because of the lack of data on this subject, these are some of the only viable statistics available that contribute to the national consensus discussion required by the first part of the
Court’s categorical exemption test. See supra note 106.
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prisoners ranging from eighteen to fifty-seven years old at the
time of arrest, who were sentenced to life without parole for nonviolent offenses, only 5.4% were twenty years old or younger.119 If
the American Civil Liberties Union’s data is an accurate reflection of the entire prison population serving life without parole
sentences for nonviolent crimes, then only roughly 5.4% of these
prisoners were between eighteen and twenty years old when they
committed their crimes.120
While sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without
parole is not statutorily barred, “those sentences are most infrequent” according to the few statistics that exist.121 The Graham
Court concluded there was a national consensus against imposing
life without parole on juvenile nonviolent offenders because the
sentence was so rare, despite the numerous opportunities to administer it.122 Similarly, the infrequency of sentencing eighteento twenty-year-olds to life without parole does not stem from a
lack of opportunity, as this age group is statistically the most violent.123 The top four individual age groups arrested for murder
and non-negligent manslaughter in 2010 were nineteen-year-olds,
eighteen-year-olds, twenty-one-year-olds, and twenty-year-olds,
respectively.124 While eighteen- to twenty-year-olds—along with
twenty-one-year-olds—are statistically the most violent,125 only
one percent of eighteen- to thirty-nine-year-olds were sentenced
to life, life without parole, life plus years, or death in 2013.126
Even though sentencing this class of offenders to life without
parole is rare, so long as it is legally permissible, there is an intolerable risk of sentencing an eighteen- to twenty-year-old to life
without parole when he or she lacks the culpability to deserve
such an extreme sentence. While the statistics cited above are not
conclusive, they facially satisfy the first of the Court’s two necessary conditions for categorical exemption because there appears
to be a national consensus against sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole.
119. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 3, at 26 tbl.7.
120. Again, the author recognizes this is far too small of a sample size to conclusively
claim that the ACLU’s data is reflective of the entire prison population. See supra note
106.
121. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
122. Id. at 67.
123. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES,
1990–2010, at 17–18 tbl.3 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 11, at 21 tbl.15.
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B. Part Two: Life Without Parole is a Disproportionate
Punishment for Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds
The second prong of the Court’s categorical exemption test requires determining whether sentencing eighteen- to twenty-yearolds to life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment.127 This
analysis requires “consideration of the culpability of the offenders
at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the
severity of the punishment in question” and whether the practice
serves legitimate penological goals.128 Using the Court’s logic,
sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without parole is
a disproportionate punishment, regardless of the crime, and the
three mitigating characteristics recognized of juveniles negate the
penological justifications for sentencing eighteen- to twenty-yearolds to life without parole.129
1. The Lack of Culpability of Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds
As discussed above, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are similar to
juveniles in that they are prone to risky behavior130 and susceptible to negative outside influences.131 According to the Court,
“[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the
fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may
dominate in younger years can subside.”132 However, the mitigating qualities the Court was referring to have not yet subsided by
age eighteen, and even the Court has recognized this.133 The
Court has also acknowledged that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character
deficiencies will be reformed.”134 For this same reason, the crimi-

127. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
128. Id. at 67.
129. See id. at 68, 74, 77–78 (holding that juveniles’ mitigating characteristics rendered
penological justifications inadequate to justify the severity of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, and discretionary sentencing of juveniles to life without parole was too dangerous of a risk to allow).
130. See, e.g., Cauffman et al., supra note 77, at 203–04.
131. See, e.g., Bradley & Wildman, supra note 12, at 263.
132. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 368 (1993)).
133. Id. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18.”).
134. Id. at 570.
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nal justice system should not hold psychologically and neurologically immature eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to the same standard of culpability as thirty-year-olds.
2. The Severity of Life Without Parole
The Court recognized that “life without parole is ‘the second
most severe penalty permitted by law.’”135 Life without parole
“deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration.”136 It stands for a “denial of hope; it means
that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind
and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of
his days.”137 The Court acknowledged that life without parole is
an especially severe punishment for juveniles because “a juvenile
offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and
a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the
same punishment in name only.”138
Similarly, an eighteen- to twenty-year-old and a seventy-fiveyear-old would receive the same punishment in name only. There
is little difference between sixteen years of age and twenty years
of age when one is framing the discussion around the years of life
ahead of them. Eighteen- to twenty-year-olds still have numerous
years and a greater percentage of their lives ahead of them than
older offenders. For this reason, life without parole is equally severe for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds as it is for juveniles.
3. The Inadequacy of Penological Justifications for Life Without
Parole
The Court has considered each traditional penological justification and held that they are inadequate to support sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without parole.139 The
Court’s reasoning for each penological justification applies to
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. The first justification, retribution,

135. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 69–70.
137. Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 74.
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is “an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or . . . an
attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim.”140 However, while retribution is a legitimate penological justification for
punishment, “‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.’”141 Behavioral, psychological, and
neurological research indicate eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are
more similar to juveniles than to older adults in regards to traits
that influence culpability, including risk-taking,142 temperance,143
and susceptibility to peer pressure.144 Just as “retribution does
not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender,”145 it does not justify imposing this sentence on eighteen- to twenty-year-olds who lack
the culpability of older adults.
The second justification, deterrence, should also be discounted.
The Graham Court noted that “‘the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.’”146 Similarly, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are less likely to be deterred because
they lack culpability. They lack the ability to anticipate future
consequences,147 have lower levels of temperance,148 and are more
likely to engage in risky behavior.149
Third, incapacitation does not justify sentencing eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds to life without parole. Just as “[a] life without
parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance
to demonstrate growth and maturity,”150 it also disregards eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. The neurological processes that lead to
the maturation of the brain have not yet matured by eighteen
years old,151 and “[h]igher-order executive function, emotional
regulation, and impulse control . . . improve through the mid-

140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
141. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) (alteration in original).
142. Cauffman et al., supra note 77, at 204.
143. Modecki, supra note 74, at 85.
144. Bradley & Wildman, supra note 12, at 263.
145. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72.
146. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
147. Steinberg et al., Age Differences, supra note 76, at 35 & tbl.1.
148. Modecki, supra note 74, at 85.
149. Cauffman et al., supra note 77, at 204.
150. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
151. See Brief for the AMA, supra note 55, at 16–24.
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twenties.”152 Life without parole sentences impair eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds’ abilities to demonstrate they will not be risks to
society for the rest of their lives.153
The fourth and final justification, rehabilitation, was discounted by the Court because “[t]he penalty forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.”154 Denying an eighteen- to twenty-year-old’s
“right to reenter the community . . . makes an irrecoverable
judgment about that person’s value and place in society.”155 As
discussed above, these offenders’ brains still need time to mature.156 Life without parole assumes eighteen- to twenty-year olds
are irredeemable, and therefore does not give them the chance to
reenter society and prove they are rehabilitated. Consequently,
following the Court’s proportionality analysis in Graham,157 there
is no penological theory that justifies life without parole for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.
4. The Risks of Discretionary Life Without Parole
The Court has also addressed individualized sentencing of juveniles.158 The Graham Court held that “‘[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive’ a sentence
of life without parole for a nonhomicide crime ‘despite insufficient
culpability.’”159 Similarly, the psychological and neurological predispositions of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are too well known to
ignore. There is too great a risk that “the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the . . .
offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true
depravity should require a sentence less severe” than life without
parole.160 Due to these risks, individualized sentencing is insufficient for a class of individuals who lack the culpability to warrant
such a harsh sentence.161 The Court should go as far as holding
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Hamilton, supra note 87, at 1115.
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
Id. at 74.
See id.
See Brief for the AMA, supra note 55, at 16–24.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
Id. at 77–79.
Id. at 78 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005)).
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
Again, while it is beyond the scope of this comment, the Court should apply this
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that life without parole is a disproportionate sentence for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds under the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Reynolds Wintersmith did not think he would die in prison, but
rather thought his sentence was so unjust that it would inevitably be corrected.162 He decided to take the advice of a fellow inmate: “You can do prison two ways. You can come here and die
mentally or physically—you can make it your graveyard. Or, you
can use it as a school and you can learn things that you could
never learn anywhere else that will help you better your life.”163
While Reynolds was incarcerated, he completed a 4100-hour
teaching apprenticeship program in order to gain the necessary
qualifications to teach.164 He also counseled fellow inmates who
struggled emotionally with their incarceration.165 Even though he
was sentenced to life without parole, he led a re-entry program
that helped inmates prepare for their release from prison.166
President Obama commuted Reynolds’s sentence on December
19, 2013, and Reynolds was released on April 17, 2014.167 He had
served more than twenty years of his life sentence for a nonviolent crime.168 Now, Reynolds has found a career as a counselor at
an alternative Chicago high school.169 He counsels students who
face significant barriers, such as working, paying rent, and raising children, while trying to finish high school.170
Reynolds is a success story. A mandatory sentence wrote Reynolds off as irredeemable without giving him the chance to show he
would not always be a risk to society.171 He is able to prove himself now that he is free, but there are others still in prison who,
under the current doctrine, will never get the chance to redeem
themselves. The current doctrine does not reflect the value of rehabilitating offenders so they can once again be productive memsame logic to juvenile homicide offenders. See supra note 101.
162. See Sweeney, supra note 3.
163. Kuhn, supra note 3.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. FAMM, supra note 1.
167. Id.
168. Kuhn, supra note 3.
169. Sweeney, supra note 3.
170. Id.
171. See Kuhn, supra note 3.
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bers of society. If offenders are imprisoned for lacking the requisite culpability for one of the harshest sentences available, the
public could lose faith in the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.
The Supreme Court should interpret the Eighth Amendment to
categorically exempt eighteen- to twenty-year-olds from life without parole. While the statistics addressed in this comment were
not conclusive, they did suggest there is a national consensus
against sentencing eighteen- to twenty-year-olds to life without
parole. Furthermore, behavioral, psychological, and neurological
research indicate eighteen- to twenty-year-olds lack the requisite
culpability to be sentenced to such an extreme punishment. The
Court should therefore apply its categorical exemption test and
hold that the Eighth Amendment categorically bans the imposition of life without parole on eighteen- to twenty-year-old offenders.
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